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PREVIEW; State v. Q. Smith: How far does Montana’s right against
unwarranted search and seizure extend?
Victoria Hill*
The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral argument in State v.
Q. Smith on Wednesday, November 3, 2021 at 9:30am via Zoom.1 Dwight
J. Schulte is expected to appear on behalf of defendant and appellant,
Quincy Smith. Austin Miles Knudsen, Brad Fjeldeim, and William E.
Fulbright are expected to appear on behalf of plaintiff and appellee, the
State of Montana.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The main issue in State v. Q. Smith is whether Deputy Monaco
violated Smith’s rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article II, § 10 of the Montana Constitution when he
followed Smith’s vehicle onto a private driveway to complete a traffic
stop, which was initiated on a public road.2
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Quincy Smith was living with his longtime friends, Jacques
Hennequin and Jacques’ wife, Carlie, in their home on Hidden Valley
Road, Florence, Montana.3 The Hidden Valley Road property is a fiveacre parcel in Ravalli County, Montana, with a fence around the property
line and interior fence around the yard, house, and garage.4 On May 15,
2019, Smith and Hennequin were returning home from looking at the
house that Quincy and his family had just made an offer to purchase, about
three-quarters of a mile away from his residence.5 Smith and Hennequin
drove eastbound on Hidden Valley Road to return to their residence.6
Ravalli County Sheriff Deputy Nicholas Monaco was driving
westbound on Hidden Valley Road that night.7 When Monaco observed
Smith’s vehicle traveling eastbound, he believed Smith’s vehicle was
travelling 57 mph in a 40-mph zone. Monaco then activated his lights,
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turned his vehicle around, attempted to catch up to Smith’s vehicle, and
observed it turn down a residential driveway.8
Smith and Hennequin pulled into their driveway and exited Smith’s
vehicle.9 Smith and Hennequin waited outside the vehicle in the driveway
for Monaco to exit his vehicle, informed Monaco that he was on their
private property, and asked him to leave.10 While Monaco was in his patrol
vehicle behind them in the driveway, he called in a “blackout out at res,”
indicating a parked vehicle11 with its lights off.12 Monaco also requested
backup in “code protocol,” the highest protocol possible,13 due to “two
uncooperative males.”14
Several minutes later, Ravalli County Sheriff Sergeant Jered
Guisinger arrived at the scene.15 During this time, Smith repeatedly asked
Monaco to leave the private property and return with a warrant.16 After
Guisinger arrived, Monaco told Smith he was under arrest.17 Smith turned
around and raised his hands in the air.18 Five seconds after exiting his
vehicle, Guisinger then shot Smith in the back with his taser without
warning.19
Smith was searched, seized, and cited20 for speeding, obstructing a
police officer, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (first
offense), and resisting arrest.21 Before Smith’s trial in justice court, Smith
filed a Motion to Suppress and Motion to Suppress Blood Test Results,
arguing, “law enforcement entered private property, against the express
instructions of [Smith] and the property owner, [Hennequin], and made an
unlawful search and arrest.”22 Both motions were denied, and Smith was
found guilty on all charges at his bench trial on February 19, 2020.23
Smith appealed to the District Court the same day.24 The District
Court denied Smith’s motions on May 26, 2020, finding that Monaco
“pursued [Smith] in furtherance of a lawful investigatory stop under
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[Mont. Code Ann. § 46-5-401].”25 Smith then appealed to the Montana
Supreme Court.26
The parties dispute whether Monaco’s patrol lights were visible to
Smith before Smith’s vehicle entered the residential driveway. Smith
maintains that he did not see Monaco’s patrol lights until he parked at
home and exited his vehicle.27 Monaco testified that his lights were
activated before Smith made a substantial turn around a corner on Hidden
Valley Road.28
III.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A. Appellant’s Arguments

Smith offers two arguments: (1) Smith had a reasonable right to
privacy from Monaco’s search because Smith was in the curtilage of his
residence; and (2) no exigent circumstances existed that would allow
Monaco’s warrantless entry onto Smith’s property.29
First, Smith argues that he had a reasonable right to privacy because
he was a resident of the home and was within the curtilage of his residence
at the time of the warrantless search.30 Although Smith was not the owner
of the home at Hidden Valley Road, Smith argues that he had an
expectation of privacy even as a guest in Hennequin’s home.31 Under the
precedent set in Minnesota v. Olson,32 even an overnight guest has an
expectation of privacy.33
Furthermore, Smith argues he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
because he was within the curtilage of his residence.34 Smith references
that Montana extended the right to privacy on private land in State v.
Bullock,35 which held
Where that expectation [of privacy] is evidenced by fencing, ‘No
Trespassing,’ or similar signs, or ‘by some other means [which]
indicate[s] unmistakably that entry is not permitted’ entry by law
enforcement officers requires permission or a warrant.36
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Here, Smith argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
because the Hidden Valley Road property is fenced and had other
indicators that entry was not permitted.37 At the time of the search, Smith
was standing in front of the garage within the inner most of two fences,
which he argues clearly delineated the curtilage of the residence.38 Smith
also notes that the five-acre property is surrounded by foliage and
landscaping to block view, was not readily visible from the public road,
and could only be accessed by driving up a 350-foot private driveway, and
argues that these characteristics delineated the curtilage of the residence to
indicate that entry was not permitted.39 Thus, Smith concludes that the
search was unlawful because Smith has a reasonable expectation of
privacy within the curtilage of Smith’s residence and Monaco did not have
a warrant or permission to enter the curtilage of Smith’s residence.40
Next, Smith argues that no exigent circumstances existed that would
permit Monaco’s warrantless entry by comparing the facts here with this
Court’s precedent in State v. Saale.41 In Saale, the defendant was involved
in a vehicle roll-over accident and fled the scene of the accident, returning
to her home.42 When officers arrived at Saale’s house, Saale’s husband
denied them entry.43 The officers determined that they could enter Saale’s
house without a warrant due to the exigent circumstances of Saale’s
potential intoxication and trying to elude officers.44 However, the Court
rejected the notion that possibly being intoxicated and trying to elude
officers were exigent circumstances that allowed a warrantless entry into
Saale’s home.45 Smith argues that the facts here are similar to Saale, and
therefore the Court should find for Smith.46
Finally, Smith rebuts the State’s argument that the hot pursuit warrant
exception is applicable here.47 Hot pursuit, or fresh pursuit, is the right of
a police officer to make a warrantless search of a fleeing suspect or of the
place to which the suspect has fled.48 Smith cites State v. Sorenson49 to
support his argument that the theory of hot pursuit “is not available to
peace officers unless a felony has been committed and the suspect is
fleeing.”50 But here, Smith was never suspected of having committed a
37
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felony.51 Rather, Smith argues that his investigation for a speeding
violation exempts Monaco’s warrantless search from the theory of hot
pursuit.52
B. Appellee’s Arguments
The State offers two arguments: (1) Smith could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in this case; and (2) the theory of hot pursuit ought
to apply here.53
First, the State argues Smith could not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy by attempting to distinguish the facts in Bullock with the facts
here.54 First, the State distinguishes the temporal nature of the Fourth
Amendment violations alleged between Bullock and Smith, noting that law
enforcement in Bullock investigated a crime hours later, whereas Monaco
investigated an immediate speeding violation.55 Another distinction the
State offers is that the layout of the property involved differs from Bullock
because Smith did not have “no trespassing” signs posted, the exterior
fence is not a “privacy fence,” and there were no closed gates on the
property.56 The final distinction the State offers is Smith’s assertion that
Monaco leave the property was “more of an indication of not wanting to
have any interaction with law enforcement than an exercise of [Smith and
Hennequin’s] privacy rights in the driveway.”57
Next the State argues that its interest outweighs Smith’s expectation
of privacy in the driveway of his residence because the theory of hot
pursuit ought to apply in this case.58 While the State concedes that
Sorenson states that the doctrine of hot pursuit is unavailable to peace
officers until a felony has been committed and the suspect is fleeing,59 the
State argues that Montana law provides that the driver of a motor vehicle
may be arrested without a warrant if the arresting officer is in uniform and
displays the officer’s badge of authority and observes the recording of the
speed of the vehicle by radio microwaves or other electrical device.60
Furthermore, in opposition to Smith’s comparison of the facts here
with the facts in Bullock, the State argues that the facts here more closely
mirror those in Arizona v. Hernandez,61 an Arizona case.62 As in
51
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Hernandez, the State argues that Smith impliedly consented to Monaco’s
presence and interaction by choosing to lead the officer on the private
property.63 The Hernandez court used a reasonableness balancing test
between an individual’s expectation of privacy against the officer’s
reasons for being on the private property.64
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches.
Montana’s Constitution grants specific privacy rights beyond those of the
United States Constitution.65 Article II, § 10 of the Montana Constitution
states, “The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest.” In determining if a search violated the Montana
Constitution, the Court will look to two factors: “(1) whether the person
has an actual expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as
objectively reasonable, and (2) the nature of the state’s intrusion.”66
A. The Court will likely find that Smith had an actual expectation of
privacy that society is willing to recognize as objectively
reasonable.
Warrantless searches and seizures conducted inside a home are per se
unreasonable, subject to a few carefully drawn exceptions, such as exigent
circumstances.67 Smith argues that Montana’s additional privacy rights
under Article II, § 10 of the Montana Constitution and the Court’s
precedent in Bullock favor extending this per se rule beyond the actual
“home” to the “curtilage” of the residence.68 The Court here is unlikely to
extend this per se rule because the Court has declined this invitation in
favor of a circumstances test in numerous cases.69
However, if the Court extends the per se unreasonable rule from State
v. Wakeford,70 the question then becomes whether there were exigent
circumstances that allowed for a warrantless search. This argument is
difficult for the State to win, as the State bears the heavy burden of
63
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showing the existence of exigent circumstances.71 While the State argues
that Smith eluded law enforcement72 and that Monaco’s warrantless entry
was justified under hot pursuit,73 the precedent set by Sorenson is clear:
“the theory of hot pursuit is unavailable to peace officers until a felony has
been committed and the suspect is fleeing.”74 If the Court finds that the
search was per se unreasonable under Wakeford, and that there were no
exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry, then the Court must
reverse Smith’s conviction.
If the Court refuses to extend Wakeford, it will determine whether
Smith had a reasonable expectation of privacy by weighing the
circumstances of the case, including “the place of the investigation; the
control exercised by the person over the property; and the extent to which
the person took measures to shield the property from public view to
communicate that entry is not permitted.”75 The latter factor is the biggest
point of contention in this case. The Court will likely find that Smith had
an actual expectation of privacy that Montana will recognize as
reasonable. The facts here are positioned somewhere between Bullock,
where an expectation of privacy was found,76 and State v. Hubbel, where
the defendant did not have an expectation of privacy on private land
leading up and including the threshold of his residence.77 In Hubbel, a case
which goes unmentioned by the State,78 the Court held that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in property leading to the front door of
the residence79 because there was not a fence separating the property from
the highway, no shrubs or bushes to shield the property from public view,
and no posted signs indicating that entry was not permitted.80 Smith
distinguishes the facts here from those in Hubbel81 by offering evidence of
the shrubbery and fencing around the property that prevent visitors from
observing what is in plain view.82 While the State attempts to distinguish
the curtilage in Bullock that was labeled with “No Trespassing” signs,83
the Court in Bullock offers other alternatives to signage to delineate private
property84 that are appropriately raised by Smith.85 Thus, Q. Smith is more

71

Id. at 1069 (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1984)).
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 14.
Id. at 13.
74
590 P.2d 136, 139 (1979).
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State v. Hubbel, 951 P.2d 971, 977 (Mont. 1997) (referencing Bullock, 901 P.2d at 76).
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901 P.2d at 76.
77
951 P.2d at 977.
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See generally Brief of Appellee, supra note 2.
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Hubbel, 951 P.2d at 977.
80
Id.
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Id. at 978.
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See Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 3–6.
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See Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 15.
84
See State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 76 (Mont. 1995) (citing People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1338
(N.Y. 1992)).
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akin to Bullock, and the facts favor a finding of a reasonable expectation
of privacy.
Furthermore, public policy favors finding that Smith had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. On a balancing of interests and burdens, the State
has a low interest in pursuing misdemeanants without a warrant, and a low
burden in obtaining a warrant. Monaco had the ability to obtain a warrant
and did obtain a warrant later to obtain a sample of Smith’s blood.86
Monaco testified:
Q: Did you ever get a warrant?
A: I obtained a telephonic search warrant for the Defendant’s blood,
but not a warrant with regard to any other aspect of the stop.
Q: But you had the ability to get a warrant, as evidenced by the fact
that you received one for the blood?
A: Yes. 87

In contrast to the low burden on the state, Montanans have a high
interest in maintaining their Fourth Amendment rights, as the Montana
Constitution explicitly requires the showing of a compelling state interest
to justify infringements on an individual’s privacy rights.88
As a matter of public policy, if the only reason that Smith does not
have a privacy interest within the curtilage of his residence is because he
failed to post “no trespassing signs,”89 while offering several other means
of delineating the curtilage of the residence,90 Montanans privacy rights
are not as strong as the State Constitution claims. Because Q. Smith is more
akin to Bullock, and because there is a strong public policy in favor of
finding a right to privacy, the Court will likely find that Smith had a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
B. The Court will likely find that the nature of the State’s intrusion
was more than minimal.
Next, the Court will consider the nature of the State’s intrusion.91
Here, the Court must determine whether the state’s method of
investigation is so personally invasive that the Court recognizes the
intrusion as a search that requires further justification, such as a warrant
or other special circumstances.92 In Hubbel, the Court considered the
86
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officers entry onto private property as minimal because they “did nothing
other than what any other casual visitor to the residence would do.”93 The
Hubbel Court referenced that the police officers “did not ignore posted
warnings, hop fences, open gates, or slip through bushes intended to screen
the home from view.” While Smith attempts to maximize the importance
of the bushes on the exterior of the home,94 considering that there were not
“No Trespassing” signs posted and no closed gates,95 the facts here align
more with the minimal intrusion found in Hubbel because the driveway at
issue here is similar to the general parking area routinely used by other
visitors in Hubbel. Similarly, in City of Whitefish v. Large,96 the Court held
that officers’ entry through the common-area parking lot was not overly
intrusive in the absence of no trespassing signs and gates.97 However, in
Bullock, the Court explained that “what an individual seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”98 Here, although the driveway was a publicly accessible area,
Smith verbally indicated that the State’s intrusion was not minimal by
warning Monaco that he was on private property and requesting that
Monaco leave immediately.99
V. CONCLUSION
The Court in State v. Q. Smith has an opportunity to return to
Bullock’s principle and reaffirm that Montana continues to hold that its
Constitution affords citizens broader protection to the right to privacy than
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court will
likely follow a facts and circumstances test to determine whether Smith
had an actual expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as
objectively reasonable, and the nature of the state’s intrusion. The Court
will likely find that the facts in Q. Smith are similar to the facts in Bullock,
and thus find that Smith had an actual expectation of privacy that society
is willing to recognize as objectively reasonable, and that the nature of the
state’s intrusion was enough to violate Smith’s rights against unwarranted
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Montana
Constitution.
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